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We  argue that to support agriculture–environmental policy decision making, stake-
holders need ‘quantitative back-of-the-envelope’ analysis that is timely and sufﬁciently
accurate to make informed decisions. We apply this concept to the analysis of the sup-
ply of ecosystem services from agriculture. We present a spatially explicit production
model and show how it can be used to derive the supply of ecosystem services in a
region. This model shows that the supply of ecosystem services can be derived from
the spatial distribution of opportunity cost of providing those services. We then show
how this conceptual model can be used to develop a minimum-data (MD) approach
to the analysis of the supply of ecosystem services from agriculture that can be imple-
mented with the kinds of secondary data that are available in most parts of the world.
We  apply the MD approach to simulate the supply of carbon that could be seques-
tered in agricultural soils in the dryland grain-producing region of Montana. We ﬁnd
that the supply curve derived from the MD approach can approximate the supply
curve obtained from a more elaborate model based on site-speciﬁc data, and can do








Increasingly, the focus of agricultural policy is shifting from traditional subsidy
and trade policies to conservation and environmental aspects of agriculture
(i.e., to policies that provide farmers with incentives for increasing the supply
of ecosystem services from agriculture). This shift in policy emphasis is
explained partly by a growing public demand for these ecosystem services
that are public goods, including wildlife habitat, visual amenities and open
space, water quality protection, and greenhouse gas mitigation. This shift in
policy focus also has been encouraged by the incorporation of agriculture
into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in the mid-1990s, and the
ongoing negotiations to reduce industrialised-country agricultural subsidies
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Just and Antle (1990, p. 197) proposed a conceptual framework for analysis
of agriculture–environment policy interactions: ‘This framework integrates
physical and economic models at a disaggregate level necessary to capture the
heterogeneity of the physical environment and the economic behaviour of
farmers’. Since then, a number of researchers have utilised site-speciﬁc data
and models to implement analysis of agriculture–environment interactions





















2005). However, high-resolution biophysical and economic data with the geo-
graphic coverage needed for analysis of agriculture–environment interactions,
such as the National Resources Inventory data in the United States, are excep-
tional, and provide limited economic information. In most cases, site-speciﬁc
economic data are only available from special-purpose farm surveys, and the
time and resources required to undertake special-purpose surveys precludes
their use for most policy analysis.
In this paper, we develop a minimum-data (MD) approach to the analysis
of the supply of ecosystem services from agriculture that can be implemented
with data that are readily available in most parts of the world from existing
secondary sources. Due to the need for timely analysis, often policy decisions
must be based on qualitative analysis. The MD approach is motivated by the
demand for timely, quantitative analysis of agriculture–environment inter-
actions that can provide sufﬁciently accurate analysis of policy scenarios
to support informed policy decision making. There is always a trade-off
between timeliness and accuracy of information for policy decision making.
Our experience suggests that policy decision makers need quantitative, ‘back-
of-the-envelope’ analysis that is accurate within, say, an order of magnitude.
The appropriate level of accuracy for policy analysis is arguably lower than




policy modelling involves a large number of unquantiﬁable uncertainties, and
because the policy process utilises many sources of information and must
balance competing political interests.
In the ﬁrst section of this paper, we present a spatially explicit production
model and show how it can be used to derive the supply of ecosystem ser-
vices in a region. This model shows that the supply of ecosystem services can
be derived from the spatial distribution of opportunity cost of providing
those services. In the second section of the paper, we show that under some
plausible simplifying assumptions, the spatial distribution of opportunity
cost can be approximated with a small number of parameters that can
be estimated with the kinds of data that are generally available from
secondary sources. We apply this MD approach to simulate the supply of
carbon that could be sequestered in agricultural soils in the dryland
grain-producing region of Montana. We ﬁnd that the supply curve derived
from the MD approach provides a good approximation to the supply curve
obtained from an econometric-process simulation model based on site-speciﬁc
data. 
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2. Modelling the supply of ecosystem services
 
The analysis of the supply of ecosystem services begins with the observation
that farmers’ land use and management decisions may affect biological and
physical systems through a number of mechanisms. These effects may be
limited to the land owned by the farmer, such as a change in soil productivity, or
may have off-site effects, such as chemical run-off into surface waters. Absent
policies that affect farmers’ incentives, we assume farmers make land use and
management decisions to maximise their perceived economic well-being. These
decisions result in a supply of ecosystem services that is determined by farm-
ers’ economic incentives to supply market goods (crops and livestock), but
does not take into account society’s valuation of the ecosystem services. To
increase the supply of ecosystem services beyond this private equilibrium,
demanders of ecosystem services must provide farmers with incentives to
change their management decisions in ways that increase those services. In
most cases, ecosystem services are public goods, so some form of government
intervention or assignment of property rights will be needed to create these
incentives. For example, in the case of greenhouse gas mitigation through
carbon sequestration, a government program could pay farmers to adopt
practices that sequester carbon. Alternatively, a government regulation that
caps greenhouse gas emissions could create a market for carbon emissions
reduction credits, providing farmers with an incentive to sequester carbon.









, in a geographic region. These land uses can be any kind
of productive activity or a conserving use of the land, as long as a value can
be associated with it. For example, if crop rotation is involved, then the
appropriate value could be an annualised value of the rotational system. The





















 is a parameter (more generally a vector), interpreted
















 indexes the activity at
the site. This value function could be a linear or non-linear function of re-
turns or any other objective function. The model can be generalised in various




 as an expected




 as the expected present value of returns
for analysis of investment problems. We assume for simplicity that adjustment
costs associated with changing from one land use to another are zero (we discuss







































































) units per hectare per time








 is in use, and that zero ser-








produces zero ecosystem services without loss of generality, since the analysis
here is based on the difference between the two practices. Alternatively, it can




 also produces a positive service ﬂow, but practice 
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preted as the expected rate of ecosystem services obtained from changing




. (2003), we assume that because of costs associated with measuring and
verifying changes in ecosystem services, contracts for provision of ecosystem




 estimate of ecosystem services within rela-
tively homogeneous agro-ecozones.
To derive the expected private equilibrium supply of ecosystem service in
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. (2003), to increase the supply of ecosystem services



















to the land managers by a private or government entity for increasing the
quantity of the ecosystem service. Without loss of generality, we assume that
farmers are paid only for an increase in ecosystem services relative to a base-
line, as might be the case for carbon sequestration when contracts reward
only additional carbon sequestered in response to the offer of an environmental
payment. Alternatively, it could be assumed that farmers who adopted prac-
tice b before environmental payments were offered are paid for the ecosystem
services they produce. This policy would increase the cost of producing any
given quantity of ecosystem service by the amount peS(p). Also note that an
efﬁcient incentive system would pay farmers a positive price for increasing
ecosystem services and tax them for any actions that reduced them. This type
of symmetric incentive could be modelled in essentially the same way as the
positive incentive example presented here.
Note that the amount of ecosystem service supplied at each site is not known
ex ante, and therefore payments must be based on expected ecosystem services.
The estimated quantity of ecosystem services could be estimated on a site-
speciﬁc basis if sufﬁciently good data were available. Alternatively, if the goal
of the buyer of ecosystem services is to obtain a total quantity in the region
rp d rp ()    () ,     ()    =≤ ≤
−∞  
0
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and not to obtain a speciﬁc amount at a given site, payments could be based
on an average rate of services for the region that could subsequently be veriﬁed
on a regional basis through a statistically-based sampling and measurement
scheme (e.g., for a discussion of this type of contract for soil carbon sequestra-
tion, see Antle et al. 2003). Here we make this latter assumption, and therefore
the landowner receives a value of v(p, s, a) for using practice a and v(p, s, b) +
pe e for using practice b, where e is interpreted as the expected amount of
services produced with practice b. Therefore, the farmer will choose activity
b if ω(p, s) – pe e < 0. The following three cases may occur at each site s:
Case 1. Activity b is more proﬁtable without payments (ω(p, s) < 0), and
therefore is also more proﬁtable with payments for ecosystem services.
At these sites, farmers adopt practice b without an environmental
payment.
Case 2. Activity a is more proﬁtable without a payment for ecosystem ser-
vices, but activity b is more proﬁtable with environmental payments.
This is the case where ω(p, s) > 0, but ω(p, s) – pe e < 0. Thus, the
decision maker will switch to activity b if the payment per unit of
additional ecosystem service is greater than the opportunity cost per
unit of additional ecosystem service (i.e., if pe > ω(p, s)/e).
Case 3. Activity a is more proﬁtable whether or not environmental payments
are received. Thus, ω(p, s) > 0, ω(p, s) – pe e > 0 and ω(p, s)/e > pe.
This last inequality means that the opportunity cost per unit of eco-
system service is always positive and greater than the payment per unit
of ecosystem service, hence the farmer will not enter the land unit into
a contract that would require switching from practice a to practice b.
The site-speciﬁc land-use decisions can be linked to the regional supply
of ecosystem services as shown in Figure 1. Using the spatial distribution of
opportunity cost deﬁned above, ϕ(ω), we can make a change of variable and
deﬁne the spatial distribution of opportunity cost per unit of ecosystem ser-
vice as φ(ω/e) = ϕ(ω)e, as illustrated in the left side of Figure 1 (Freund 1962,
p. 120). The area under the spatial distribution of opportunity cost on the
interval (–∞, 0) equals r(p) and represents those land units where farmers use
practice b without environmental payments (case 1). Thus, at the point where
pe = ω/e = 0, the baseline supply of ecosystem services equals S(p). Those land
units corresponding to the range of opportunity cost between zero and pe will
switch from activity a to b and thus increase the supply of ecosystem services to
a quantity greater than S(p) (case 2). Deﬁne this proportion of the land area as
(3)
The supply of ecosystem services at price pe > 0 is equal to
S(p, pe) = S(p) + r(p, pe) H e. (4)
rpp ed e e
P e
(,  )     (/)(/) . = 
0
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Those land units where opportunity cost is greater than pe will remain in
activity a (case 3). As pe increases, r(p, pe) increases and approaches 1 – r(p).
Equation (4) shows that the total quantity of ecosystem service is equal to
the baseline quantity, S(p), plus the additional quantity supplied, r(p, pe) H
e, due to the positive incentive. In some contexts, such as greenhouse gas
mitigation, buyers of emission offsets get credit only for additional carbon
sequestered above and beyond the baseline quantity, so the supply curve for
carbon sequestration would be deﬁned as S(p, pe) – S(p) = r(p, pe) H e.
Figure 1 shows that the shape of the supply curve is determined by the
form of the spatial distribution of opportunity cost and the point at which
the distribution crosses the origin. The supply curve approaches a vertical
asymptote equal to the maximum amount of ecosystem service (H e) that can
be produced when every land unit switches to activity b. The variance of the
opportunity cost of changing practices plays a critical role in determining the
shape of the supply curve of ecosystem services, as illustrated in Figure 2.
When the variance is positive, the supply curve has a positive slope, with its
concavity depending on the position of the distribution of opportunity cost
in relation to the origin. As the variance increases, the supply curve rotates
counterclockwise about the point A. As the variance decreases and approaches
zero, the supply curve approaches the shape of a step function with the step
Figure 1 Derivation of the supply of ecosystem services from the spatial distribution of
opportunity cost per unit of ecosystem services.Ecosystem services from agriculture 7
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occurring at the value of ω/e where the mass of the distribution lies. This
limiting case of a zero variance is equivalent to a representative farm model
applied to all land units in the region. If pe < ω/e, then none of the land units
enter contracts to supply additional ecosystem services above the baseline
amount, so the supply curve would lie on the vertical axis. At the point where
pe = ω/e, all land units where practice b had not already been adopted would
switch from a to b and so the supply function would increase to the maxi-
mum H e at that point, and become vertical again for all higher prices.
If the rate of ecosystem services were known on a site-speciﬁc basis, then
the spatial correlation between the opportunity cost and ecosystem services
would need to be taken into account in deriving the spatial distribution of
opportunity cost per unit of ecosystem service. For example, see Dorrman et al.
(1990) who show that an approximation to the variance of a ratio of random
variables can be made using their variances and covariance.
In addition to changes in expected returns, the opportunity cost of changing
practices could include ﬁxed costs of capital needed to utilise the new prac-
tice (deﬁned here as an annualised value per hectare, F). Also, participation
in government programs or ecosystem service markets could involve transaction
costs (TC, deﬁned here as an annual cost per hectare). The farmer now enters
a contract if
Figure 2 Effect of the variance of the opportunity cost of changing practices on the supply
curve for ecosystem services.8J . Antle and R. Valdivia
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v(p, b) + pe e − F − TC > v(p, a)
or if
pe > ω(p, s)/e + (F + TC)/e. (5)
Thus, ﬁxed and transaction costs create a threshold value of pe below which
it will not be proﬁtable for farmers to switch practices. In the case where e is
a constant expected value in the region, this effect shifts the supply curve
upwards (or leftwards) so that the baseline value S(p) occurs at this positive
threshold price pe = (F + TC)/e rather than at pe = 0. In the case where e varies
spatially, the threshold price for the supply curve will equal (F + TC)/emax
where emax is the maximum carbon rate in the region.
Finally, we observe that ﬁxed costs of adoption and transaction costs are
difﬁcult to observe and are difﬁcult to estimate ex ante. Similarly, in develop-
ing countries there may be a variety of factors, such as market imperfections,
that imposed unobserved costs on farmers and thus constrain adoption of
certain practices. The logic of this model suggests a simple method to estimate
the population average of these adoption and transaction costs. To illustrate,
suppose that data are available to estimate ω(p, s)/e (as discussed in the fol-
lowing section), and using that information the model predicts that the pro-
portion of farmers adopting the practice should be r(p, 0) > 0. However, suppose
that we observe that a smaller proportion of farmers, say rC < r(p, 0), are
actually using the practice. We could infer that this difference is due to un-
observed costs that shift the distribution of opportunity cost leftward and cause
the model without these costs to overpredict adoption. Thus, the value of the
ﬁxed cost term sufﬁcient to set rC = r(p, 0) could be interpreted as an estimate
of the unobserved costs of adoption.
3. Minimum-data methods to simulate the supply of ecosystem services
The analysis in the preceding section shows that the economic information
needed to simulate land-use decisions is the expected value for each competing
land-use activity at each site. As noted in the introduction, one solution is to
use site-speciﬁc data to estimate and then simulate an appropriate site-speciﬁc
behavioural model, as has been performed in the literature cited there. Site-
speciﬁc land-use and management decisions can be combined with outputs
from biophysical simulation models to estimate the quantity of expected eco-
system service supplied on each land unit, e, for a given economic incentive
(price) for that service. Repeating this analysis over a range of prices, the analyst
can aggregate these quantities across land units and thus derive the regional
supply curve for ecosystem services. A critical difﬁculty with this approach,
as noted in the introduction, is that it requires sufﬁcient site-speciﬁc data on
inputs, outputs and prices of individual production activities to estimate
behavioural equations. Such data are rarely available on the regional or
national basis needed for policy analysis.Ecosystem services from agriculture 9
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The alternative approach proposed here is to use secondary data (e.g., data
available from governmental agencies), other available data (e.g., data on yield
variability), expert judgement as necessary, and sensitivity analysis, to para-
meterise directly the spatial distribution of net returns to competing activities,
and then simulate land allocation decisions using suitable decision rules (e.g.,
maximisation of expected returns or expected utility). Often secondary data
are available for ‘average’ or ‘representative’ costs and returns for a geographical
region such as a county or agro-ecozone. In the MD approach proposed
here, secondary data are used to estimate mean expected net returns to each
activity in each region. In addition, estimates of spatial variability in expected
returns are needed. In the case study presented below, we assume that farmers
in a region form similar output price expectations (e.g., based on future
prices adjusted for transportation costs), and face similar factor prices and
average costs of production. In addition, we assume that variable costs of
production are approximately proportional to expected output. For example,
Antle and Capalbo (2001) found that cost functions for wheat and barley
production exhibited costs of production with approximately unitary output
elasticities, and this is typical of ﬁeld-scale or farm-scale econometric pro-
duction studies. Therefore, we can plausibly assume that cost of production c
≈ κ y, where κ is a constant across space, and y is yield. It then follows that
for a given expected output price p, net returns are v = py − c ≈ (p − κ)y,
hence, it also follows that the coefﬁcient of variation in net returns across
land units in a region (at a point in time) can be estimated by the spatial coef-
ﬁcient of variation for y. Available data show that this approach provides an
approximation that is well within an order of magnitude. For example, using
ﬁeld-level data and simulations from the study by Antle and Capalbo (2001),
the spatial coefﬁcients of variation for winter wheat and spring wheat yields
in Montana are 79 and 91 per cent, whereas the coefﬁcients of variation in
simulated net returns are 90 and 86 per cent (Table 1). Data from a ﬁeld-level
survey in Peru show that coefﬁcients of variation for potato, grain and legume
crops are 135, 97 and 122 per cent, whereas simulated net returns had coefﬁcients
of variation of 151, 103 and 144 per cent. For Peru, crop simulation models were
also used to estimate yields for each ﬁeld in the survey data. These simulated
yields had coefﬁcients of variation 54 to 69 per cent lower than the observed
yields. Table 1 also shows county-level yields for these crops for Montana
and Peru. As expected, the aggregated data show lower variation than the ﬁeld
data. These data suggest that simulated, ﬁeld-level net return variation can
be approximated with ﬁeld-level yield variation, but simulated variances and
variances from aggregated data underestimate observed ﬁeld-level yield vari-
ability by a factor of 1.5 to 3. Therefore, if researchers have only simulated
or aggregated yield data available, estimates of variability will need to be
increased, perhaps by a factor of two, although further research will need to
be conducted to see if this rule of thumb is more generally valid.
As shown in the previous section, land-use decisions in a region are deter-
mined by the spatial distribution of the difference in expected value ∆v(p, s).10 J. Antle and R. Valdivia
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The expectation of this difference is simply E(∆v) = E[v(a)] – E[v(b)], and the
variance of the difference between returns to a and b is 





b as discussed above, it may be more difﬁcult to obtain data to estimate the
covariance σab. To gain some insight into how this covariance enters the ana-





2, as is likely to be the case, for example, when
the two practices involve growing the same crop with a different tillage practice
or a different use of fallow in the rotation. Substituting σ
2 into the expression
for σ
2
a–b it follows that σ
2
a–b ≈ 2σ
2(1 – ρab) where ρab is the correlation between
returns for activities a and b. Thus, as the correlation between the expected
returns approaches 1, the variance of their difference approaches zero, and
the supply curve approaches a step function, as illustrated in Figure 2. As the
correlation approaches zero, the variance of their difference approaches 2σ
2
and the supply curve takes on a positive slope. In many cases the spatial cor-
relation between returns to alternative practices is likely to be relatively high
– for example the returns to wheat grown with conventional tillage should be
highly but not perfectly correlated with the returns to wheat grown with con-
servation tillage, as suggested by research showing that in some cases conserva-
tion tillage results in higher yield variability than conventional tillage (Uri 2000).
In other cases, the correlation will be low and approach zero, for example in the
case where one of the alternative land uses is participation in a government
conservation program with a ﬁxed return.
Given an estimate of the mean and variance of the difference in expected
returns between the two competing activities, we can proceed to simulate
land-use decisions in a region by parameterising the distribution of opportunity
cost and using Equations (1) and (2) to derive the supply curve. This can be
accomplished under the assumption of normally distributed returns by simply
noting that the difference of two normally distributed random variables
is itself normal. Alternatively, in cases where either normal or non-normal
σσ σσ ab a b a b − =+−
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Winter wheat 79 25 n.a. 90
Spring wheat 91 32 n.a. 86
Peru
Potato and tubers 135 43 53 151
Grains 97 67 30 103
Legumes 122 77 56 144
Source: Montana ﬁeld data and simulation models reported in Antle and Capalbo (2001); Peru ﬁeld data
and simulation models described in Valdivia (2002). Montana county coefﬁcients of variation (CV) are for
1999–2001 crops. Peru CV are for 2001–2003 crops grown in departments in the sierra with characteristics
similar to the Cajamarca region where the ﬁeld data were collected.Ecosystem services from agriculture 11
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distributions are used (e.g., log-normal or gamma), the simulation may be
implemented by repeatedly sampling from the distributions of net returns for
each activity, and selecting the activity with the highest expected returns.
This process is performed once for the baseline case (no payments for ecosys-
tem services) and then for each payment level that is of interest. In the base
case (no payment for ecosystem services), we would expect the land allocation
to match the observed land allocation between the two practices (the point
S(p) in Figure 1). If more land is allocated by the model to the conservation
practices than is observed, we assume that is because there are unobserved
costs of adoption. We can therefore calibrate the model to the baseline by
subtracting a cost term from the mean returns of the conservation practice
that makes the model correctly predict the baseline land allocation. This cost
term can be interpreted as an estimate of the mean adjustment cost for
adopting the conservation practice.
4. An application to soil carbon supply
In this section we apply the MD approach to simulate the soil carbon supply
curve for the dryland grain production system typical of the United States
northern plains region. Farmers can receive payments per ton of carbon
sequestered for switching from a crop–fallow rotation to continuous cropping or
a conserving use (permanent grass cover). Our goal is to replicate that anal-
ysis using the MD approach and compare the results to those from the more
detailed econometric-process simulation model.
Antle et al. (2003) used ﬁeld-scale production survey data to estimate pro-
duction models for winter wheat, spring wheat and barley crops. For each
crop, a supply function, a machinery cost equation, and a cost function were
estimated. These systems were used to parameterise an econometric-process
simulation model to simulate farmers’ participation contracts for soil carbon
sequestration. The survey data were based on a representative sample of major
land resource areas (MLRA) in the grain production region of Montana.
The econometric models that were used to construct the econometric-process
simulation model contain 124 parameters, including dummy variables for sub-
MLRA effects. The analysis of soil carbon sequestration potential used the
logic outlined above for the supply of ecosystem services. For computation of
carbon rates, these MLRA were subdivided into low- and high-precipitation
zones. The analysis was based on farmers receiving payments per metric ton
of carbon sequestered.
To  construct an MD simulation model for soil carbon sequestration, the
survey data used by Antle et al. (2003) were used to estimate means and vari-
ances of net returns to each of the crops for each of the sub-MLRA zones.
Logic suggests that the net returns to wheat produced under a crop–fallow
rotation would be highly correlated to returns under continuous cropping,
although yields under fallow are generally higher due to soil moisture stored
during the fallow season. County-level data show a correlation generally12 J. Antle and R. Valdivia
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between 0.8 and 0.9, with lower values in some years and values as high as
0.99 in other years. As with variances, we would expect ﬁeld-level correlations
to be higher than those calculated from county averages, so we conduct a
sensitivity analysis for a plausible range of correlations.
Within each of the six sub-MLRA, a simulation was run by sampling net
return distributions under the assumption of normality. Spring wheat is the
most widely grown crop, so its variance was used, with different means for
winter wheat, spring wheat and barley. The complete analysis involved four
parameters (two means, a variance, and a correlation coefﬁcient) for each of
the six zones, for a total of 24 parameters. To change the system by reducing
the use of fallow, there are no ﬁxed costs of changing practices because the
farmers use the same equipment. Changes in variable cost are accounted for
in the estimates of the net return distributions.
Figure  3 presents the results of the MD analysis simulation aggregated
across the six sub-MLRA zones, for values of the correlation coefﬁcient
equal to 0.9, 0.95 and 0.99, and the results from the original econometric-
process model analysis. The MD supply curve for a 0.95 correlation is a very
close approximation to the econometric-process model supply curve. Recall
from Table 1, the spring wheat yield variance provided a close approximation
to the variance of net returns, and is the most frequently grown crop. This
fact presumably explains why the MD model is able to provide such a close
Figure 3 Comparison of carbon supply curves from the Montana econometric-process model
and from the minimum-data model with different correlations of crop returns.Ecosystem services from agriculture 13
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approximation to the original econometric-process simulation model’s supply
curve. The key conclusion to be drawn from this example is that by setting
the correlation coefﬁcient within a plausible range of values, we can obtain a
supply curve that is adequate for policy analysis purposes. Figure 3 shows
that even though the MD supply curve changes substantially over the plausible
range of correlations, nevertheless it is well within an order of magnitude,
and much closer than that unless an extreme value of the correlation near
unity is assumed.
Figure 4 shows results from one of the sub-MLRA zones for different cor-
relation coefﬁcients. This ﬁgure conﬁrms that the supply curve follows the
pattern illustrated in Figure 2 as the variance changes, approaching a step
function as the correlation coefﬁcient approaches a value of one and the vari-
ance of opportunity cost approaches a value of zero. It also shows that using
a representative farm for the analysis – that is making the extreme assump-
tion that the spatial variance is zero – produces a very poor approximation.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a spatially explicit production model and showed
how it can be used to derive the supply of ecosystem services in a region.
This model shows that the supply of ecosystem services can be derived from
the spatial distribution of opportunity cost of providing those services. We
Figure 4 Effect of changing the correlation between crop returns on the carbon supply curves
in a Montana ecoregion.14 J. Antle and R. Valdivia
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then showed how this conceptual model can be used to develop an MD
approach to the analysis of the supply of ecosystem services from agriculture
that can be implemented with the kinds of secondary data that are available
in most parts of the world. We applied the MD approach to simulate the sup-
ply of carbon that could be sequestered in agricultural soils in the dryland
grain-producing region of Montana. We found that the supply curve derived
from the MD approach can provide a reasonably close approximation to the
supply curve obtained from a more elaborate econometric-process simulation
model based on farm-level survey data, well within the order-of-magnitude
range that we argue is needed for most policy analysis. Of course this does
not necessarily mean that the MD approach as applied here will work in
other settings. A challenge for future work is to test the MD approach with
other systems, for example in an analysis of conservation tillage adoption,
where ﬁxed adoption costs are important. Our argument is that unless one can
show that greater model complexity is needed, the virtues of simplicity in
policy analysis are likely to outweigh greater model complexity, due to the
need for timely quantitative policy analysis.
Based on our experience doing policy research, both in the United States
and in developing countries, we see three principal uses of the MD approach.
First, as suggested above, there is a demand for timely policy-relevant analysis
to support policy decision making – even in countries such as the United States
where relatively good data are available. Second, our experience in develop-
ing countries suggests that the MD approach is more appropriate than more
elaborate modelling approaches because it can be learned and implemented
at  low cost. Our experience working with national research institutions in
Latin America and Africa has shown that researchers in national research
institutions often have training and data compatible with the MD approach,
whereas implementing much more costly and elaborate modelling approaches
is prohibitively expensive. Third, we have conducted training workshops on
agricultural systems modelling in both Latin America and Africa and have
found that the MD approach also can play a useful pedagogical role due to
its simplicity and transparency.
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